And it seems that big business is driving the agenda, too. What it means for the smaller business might be rather different.

What most of us do know is that many of the euroland economies are in trouble.

Looking at growth rates last year, almost all the major European economies underperformed the UK's 1.8% growth - France hit 1.2% but The Netherlands saw minimal growth at 0.3% and Germany, on 0.2%, did even worse.

Indeed Germany is expected to see a decline in GDP this year and there are fears that it's set for a period of deflation.

A number of commentators have blamed the strong euro for its effect on export competitiveness.

However, for Germany that's not a massive factor - the dollar has tanked, but most of Germany's exports go to Euroland.

If we enter the euro, that's possibly good news for businesses dealing with other European countries - they will run fewer risks, whether they're importing or exporting.

And of course they'll also have cheaper transaction costs as currency exchange becomes a thing of the past.

(Though the devil is in the detail, and the long-term business benefits will depend on exactly the rate at which the UK enters the euro. ) On the other hand the euro's strength has lowered import prices, so that importers have better purchasing power.

Businesses which are importing from the US or Far East are currently benefiting from euro strength as not only can they increase their margins, but better prices have kept the consumer market relatively strong.

Of course, all these impacts could swing round if the dollar starts to rise - and the problems of a strong currency aren't unknown to British business.

It probably isn't the euro that is really hurting Germany's economy. There are structural problems - Germany is having its own pensions crisis - and many of Germany's largest industries depend on capital investment by companies, which has taken a downturn globally.

But because of the euro, the German government's options are limited - it can't reflate the economy by increasing government spending, or cutting interest rates, and it can't devalue the currency to help its exporters.

Ireland seems to be the opposite case from Germany in some ways. Instead of facing deflation, it's seeing a period of high inflation.

While it's still seeing high growth - export growth is still expected to run at around 4% - this has slowed dramatically from 19% over the period just before 2000.

Where Ireland is very different from both Germany and the UK is that its exports are two-thirds outside the Eurozone with only a minority inside it.

Almost a third of exports are to the US (that's only 11% of exports for Germany) and another third to the UK. The rise in the euro has therefore hurt its export trade badly.

And since Ireland is heavily dependent on multinational companies, many of which are dealing in dollars, that is going to have an effect on overall GDP growth.

How can the euro have led to inflation in Ireland, but deflation in Germany? The fact is that while the European Central Bank sets a single nominal interest rate, different inflation rates in different countries mean that the real interest rate differs significantly.

With low inflation or even deflation, the real interest rate is still positive and will deter companies from making investments and consumers from increasing their borrowings; while with high inflation, the real interest rate might even be negative - a real disincentive to save and a good reason to borrow.

So the apparent single interest rate policy can have opposite effects in two different countries.

It's worth considering that Eddie George, the just-retired governor of the Bank of England, was deeply unpopular in the Midlands and North where his high interest rate policy was considered damaging to manufacturing industry.

But with a boiling economy and surging house prices in the south east, he had little choice - what was right for one part of the British economy was wrong for the other. That's pretty much the choice facing the European Central Bank.

The Treasury estimates that taking the UK into the euro could increase trade with Euroland by anywhere between 5% and 50%.

That's quite a range.

The top forecast assumes that we'll see, for instance, increased e-commerce across borders - French customers, say, ordering from a UK website - and increased consumer sales as well as business-to-business exports.

But that implies a cultural change in some industries - and many UK businesses are not well equipped to deal with export sales.

Entering the euro would mean that the UK would have to give up its independent interest rates, its ability to manage the currency, and much of its discretion over tax and public spending.

And that could mean, as in the case of Ireland, that interest rates and fiscal policies set by the European Central Bank for the benefit of some, or most, of the other countries in the Eurozone might not suit the UK's economic situation.

However, there's evidence that the hard lines of euro doctrine are being eroded.

Both France and Germany are running "illegal" budget deficits in order to fund government spending - altogether, four Eurozone governments are now in breach of the Stability and Growth Pact, which set strict economic rules.

Both Schroder and Raffarin appear to be betting that they can get their reforms of the pension system and public sector through only if they spend enough government money to kickstart the economy. And to get there, they're breaking the rules - or at least bending them.

So by the time the UK joins the euro - if it ever does - a more pragmatic attitude might already be in evidence.

That would probably mean that the UK government would have more discretion to set its own targets, as it does now, within a much looser discipline.

The million dollar (or euro) question, though, is how far the economies of the Eurozone can diverge before the euro pulls itself apart.